Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition

One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a theory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated. In their most general form, these can be understood as rational norms, where the core idea of rationality is that we rightly respond to reasons by according the credence we attach to our doxastic and conversational commitments with the probative strength of the reasons we have for them. Certain kinds of rational failings are so because they are manifestly illogical – for example, maintaining overtly contradictory commitments, violating deductive closure by refusing to accept the logical consequences of one’s present commitments, or failing to track basing relations by not updating one’s commitments in view of new, defeating information. Yet, according to the internal and empirical critiques, logic and probability theory fail to supply a fit set of norms for human reasoning and argument. Particularly, theories of bounded rationality have put pressure on argumentation theory to lower the normative standards of rationality for reasoners and arguers on the grounds that we are bounded, finite, and fallible agents incapable of meeting idealized standards. This paper explores the idea that argumentation, as a set of practices, together with the procedures and technologies of argumentation theory, is able to extend cognition such that we are better able to meet these idealized logical standards, thereby extending our responsibilities to adhere to idealized rational norms

Attenuating indigenous property rights: land policy after the Wik decision

In December 1996, the High Court of Australia handed down its judgment in the Wik case finding, by a 4:3 majority, that pastoral leases did not necessarily extinguish native title. An intense political campaign by both pastoral and indigenous interests, and their political representatives, was aimed, in the case of the former, at legislative extinguishment of native title on pastoral leases and, in the case of the latter, at defending property rights which the High Court found had never been extinguished. In this article it argued that an efficient re-allocation of property rights is unlikely to result from extinguishment, but requires Coasian-type bargains between pastoral and indigenous interests.Land Economics/Use,

Valuing Ecosystem Services: a critical review

Although there has been much writing about ecosystem services in the last decade, there has been insufficient which clearly elucidates their value. Rather, much of the writing has been classificatory rather than analytical (e.g. the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, Total Economic Value (TEV), and environmental accounting) and has tended to complicate rather than enlighten. Further, these classification systems are not necessarily internally consistent, nor consistent with each other. There is no systematic analysis of what economic values to report within these frameworks although the SEEA would account in value added terms, consistent with a national accounting framework, and TEV focuses on economic surpluses but is often inter-temporally muddled. This paper explores the necessary modelling that is required to properly identify the value of ecosystem services, and to distinguish them from "supporting" biophysical processes that only have indirect and derivative anthropogenic values. The paper also explores the limitations of environmental accounting - comparable to national accounting - as policy-relevant analysis.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Corroborative evidence

Corroborative evidence can have a dual function in argument whereby not only does it have a primary function of providing direct evidence supporting the main conclusion, but it also has a secondary, bolstering function which increases the probative value of some other piece of evidence in the argument. It has been argued (Redmayne, 2000) that this double function gives rise to the fallacy of double counting whereby the probative weight of evidence is overvalued by counting it twice. Walton has proposed several models of corroborative evidence, each of which seems to accept the fallaciousness of double counting thereby seeming to deny the dual function of corroborative evidence. Against this view, I argue that the bolstering effect is legitimate, and can be explained by recourse to inference to the best explanation

Commentary on Jan Albert van Laar and Erik C. W. Krabbe, “Splitting a Difference of Opinion”

Jan Albert van Laar and Erik Krabbe’s paper “Splitting a difference of opinion” studies an important type of dialogue shift, namely that from a deliberation dialogue over action or policy options where critical and persuasive argumentation is exchanged about the rational acceptability of the policy options proposed by various parties, to a negotiation dialogue where agreement is reached by a series of compromises, or trade-offs, on the part of each side in the disagreement

Teaching Rational Entitlement and Responsibility: A Socratic Exercise

The paper reports on a Socratic exercise that introduces participants to the norm of rational entitlement, as distinct from political entitlement, and the attendant norm of rational responsibility. The exercise demonstrates that, because participants are not willing to exchange their own opinion at random for another differing opinion to which the owner is, by the participants\u27 own admission, entitled, they treat their entitlement to their own opinion differently, giving it a special status. This gives rise to rational obligations such as the obligation to provide reasons, and a willingness to risk those opinions to the force of the better reason